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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 The defendant appeals from the district court's denial of 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in 
which he challenges the validity of a guilty plea that he entered 
in state court.  Because we conclude that the unique 
circumstances of this case require that the defendant be afforded 
an opportunity for a hearing to resolve a factual dispute, we 
will vacate the order of the district court denying the writ of 
habeas corpus without a hearing and remand this case to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Wayne Zilich was charged with numerous offenses in state 
court in June of 1983 in connection with his alleged sexual 
molestation and rape of his daughter who was then approximately 
five and a half years old.  On November 15, 1983, Zilich waived 
his right to a jury trial and the case was assigned to an Erie 
County Court of Common Pleas Judge who scheduled a bench trial 
for March 6, 1984.  Before the start of trial Zilich entered into 
an oral plea agreement under which he agreed to plead guilty to 
one count of indecent assault and one count of corruption of a 
minor in exchange for the remaining charges being withdrawn.  
  
During the resulting guilty plea colloquy Zilich affirmed that no 
promise had been made as to the probable sentence of the court, 
and that no promise or threats of any kind had been offered to 
encourage him to plead guilty. Following the colloquy the plea 
was accepted and a date was given for sentencing. 
 Before sentencing, however, Zilich filed a petition to 
withdraw his guilty plea. In that petition he asserted his 
innocence and alleged that he had entered his plea of guilty only 
because his attorney had promised him a sentence of probation in 
exchange for paying a $4,000 bribe to the trial judge.  After the 
defendant petitioned to withdraw his plea, trial counsel was 
granted leave to withdraw, new counsel was appointed, and several 
hearings were held in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.1   
 During the various hearings, Zilich testified about 
conversations he had with his trial attorney in which he had 
purportedly been guaranteed probation in return for paying the 
alleged $4,000 bribe to the judge. Zilich testified that he 
agreed to pay his trial attorney $10,000 to represent him, and an 
additional $4,000 for the bribe.  Zilich also testified he had 
made tape recordings of conversations with his trial attorney in 
which the bribe was discussed. 
 During one of the hearings Zilich introduced the testimony 
of a paralegal who had worked in the office of Zilich's trial 
counsel. The paralegal testified that she had heard Zilich tell 
                     
 
    1 In all, six hearings were held on Zilich's petition to 
withdraw his guilty plea.   
  
his attorney that he (Zilich) wished to withdraw his guilty plea, 
that the attorney told Zilich he would take care of it, and that 
the attorney guaranteed Zilich probation. She noted that this 
guarantee surprised her because the charges were very serious.  
She further testified that Zilich had paid his trial attorney 
$10,000 to represent him, but that the attorney had subsequently 
requested an additional $4,000. 
 Zilich also produced the testimony of his wife who testified 
that she had overheard a conversation in the hallway of the 
courthouse on the day of trial. According to her testimony,  
Zilich's trial attorney told Zilich he would get probation if he 
pled guilty. She added that during that conversation the attorney 
told Zilich not to tell the judge that there was a plea bargain. 
Additional portions of her testimony also corroborated prior 
testimony that tape recordings had been made of conversations 
between her husband and his attorney.2  
 Zilich also produced the testimony of Bradley Foulk, Esq., 
an attorney who had been associated with Zilich's trial attorney. 
Foulk testified that on the day the plea was entered he overheard 
trial counsel tell Zilich not to worry. He further testified that 
he had no knowledge of any bribe or any allegations of a bribe, 
but confirmed that Zilich had claimed to have made recordings of 
conversations between himself (Zilich) and his trial attorney. 
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 The evidence about these tape recordings was conflicting. 
There was also testimony which tended to establish that these 
tapes, if they had ever existed, had been lost. Still other 
testimony challenged the existence of any such tapes.  
  
 During the course of the hearings, Zilich's trial attorney 
took the witness stand and denied all of the defendant's 
accusations. 
 Before the conclusion of the last hearing, the judge who had 
accepted the guilty plea granted a defense motion for recusal and 
the remaining hearings were held before a second judge. On June 
24, 1985, the second judge granted Zilich's petition to withdraw 
his guilty plea, however, the judge did not rule upon any of the 
defendant's allegations.  Instead, the judge granted the petition 
solely because the defendant was asserting his innocence before 
sentencing, and because the judge concluded that the prosecution 
had not established substantial prejudice.3 Commonwealth v. 
Zilich, No. 841 of 1983, (C.P. Erie, June 24, 1985).   
 On  March 11, 1987, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
reversed, reinstated Zilich's guilty plea, and remanded the case 
to the common pleas court for sentencing. The Superior Court held 
that the trial court had erred in ruling that the Commonwealth 
had failed to meet its burden of establishing it would be 
substantially prejudiced by a retrial.  Commonwealth v. Zilich, 
No. 00668 Pittsburgh, 1986 (Pa.Super., March 11, 1987). Thus, 
neither court ever ruled upon the substance of Zilich's assertion 
that he had tendered his guilty plea only because he believed he 
would get probation.  On remand Zilich was sentenced to three and 
one-half to seven years imprisonment on the charges to which he 
had plead guilty. 
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 See Commonwealth v. Neely, 449 Pa. 3, 295 A. 2d 75 (1972). 
  
 A. THE FEDERAL HABEAS PETITIONS 
 In May of 1990, Zilich filed a civil rights action in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania and he thereafter filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that 
he had entered his guilty plea only because of his attorney's 
promise of probation in exchange for the alleged bribe, and that 
the plea was therefore involuntary. Both matters were treated as 
a habeas corpus petition. The district court denied relief 
without a hearing and this appeal ultimately followed.4  
 The substance of the defendant's argument on appeal is that 
the district court erred in denying his petition without a 
hearing. 
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 The district court referred the original petition to a 
magistrate judge who thereafter filed a Report and Recommendation 
on January  7, 1991, in which it was recommended that the writ be 
denied because Zilich failed to exhaust his state remedies.  On 
March 12, 1991, the district court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation, denied the petition for habeas relief and 
recommended that a certificate of probable cause be denied.  
Zilich then filed an appeal to this Court which entered an Order 
on August 7, 1991, remanding the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings.  
 On July 21, 1993, a Report and Recommendation was again 
filed by the magistrate judge. In that Report the magistrate 
judge concluded that, based upon his review of the transcripts 
from the state proceedings, the guilty plea had been voluntarily 
entered. The report recommended that the petition be dismissed 
with no further evidentiary hearing.  The district court adopted 
the Report and Recommendation as its opinion and denied a 
certificate of probable cause.  Zilich filed an appeal from that 
determination followed by a request and a supplemental request 
for a certificate of probable cause.  On February 17, 1994, we 
granted Zilich's request for a certificate of probable cause.  
  
 II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
 In Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1991), we 
summarized the scope of our review of a district court decision 
denying a habeas petition without a hearing: 
   Our scope of review is limited as 
we sit not to retry state cases de 
novo but rather to examine the 
proceedings in the state court to 
determine if there has been a 
violation of federal constitutional 
standards. . . . Where, as here, a 
district court has denied a 
petition for  habeas corpus without 
holding an evidentiary hearing, our 
review consists of a two-step 
analysis.  First, we must determine 
whether the petitioner has alleged 
facts that, if proved, would 
entitle him to relief.  If so, we 
must then decide whether an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary to 
establish the truth of those 
allegations.  
 
923 F.2d at 291. (citations omitted).  Our review of the district 
court's decision here is plenary, as the dismissal of the habeas 
petition was based on the state court record, and not upon 
independent fact finding by the district court.  Id. at n. 5; 
Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1536 (3d Cir. 1991).  
 The Commonwealth argues that the defendant has been afforded 
an evidentiary hearing as the magistrate judge reviewed all of 
the transcripts from the numerous hearings that occurred in state 
court before recommending that the defendant's petition be 
denied.  However, it is undisputed that no fact finder has ever 
entered any findings of fact regarding the defendant's 
  
allegations that his guilty plea was induced by a promise of 
probation in return for bribing the trial judge. 
B. 
 The determination of whether a guilty plea is "voluntary" 
for purposes of the U.S. Constitution is a question of federal 
law, but the determination of the historical facts surrounding 
the plea bargain is subject to the deferential  "presumption of 
correctness" of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).  Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 
U.S. 422, 431, 103 S.Ct. 843, 849, 74 L. Ed.2d 646 (1983).5 
 A habeas petitioner challenging the voluntary nature of his 
or her guilty plea faces a heavy burden.  The plea colloquy is 
designed to uncover hidden promises or representations as to the 
consequences of a guilty plea.  It can hardly be gainsaid that 
declarations made under oath ought not to be lightly cast aside. 
Zilich testified during his plea colloquy that no promises of any 
sentence and no "deals" had been made to induce him to waive his 
right to trial and plead guilty.  "[T]he representations of the 
defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as 
well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, 
constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 
proceedings.  Solemn declarations made in open court carry a 
strong presumption of verity."  Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 
63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed.2d 136 (1977). 
Nonetheless, the Blackledge Court recognized that this burden is 
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 The "presumption of correctness" will be addressed in 
greater detail below at section "D".  
  
not "invariably insurmountable." Id.,at 754, 97 S.Ct. at 1629-30.  
 A petitioner challenging the voluntary nature of a facially 
valid guilty plea based on unfulfilled promises or 
representations by counsel must advance specific and credible 
allegations detailing the nature and circumstances of such 
promises or representations. Lesko, 925 F.2d at 1537.  A guilty 
plea induced by promises that divest the plea of its voluntary 
character is void. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 
493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). See Heiser v. Ryan, 
951 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1991) (guilty plea not voluntary where 
defendant's counsel threatened to withdraw if defendant did not 
plead guilty); United States v. Marzgliano, 588 F. 2d 395, 397-99 
(3d Cir. 1978) (petitioner's guilty plea not voluntary where 
defense counsel misled defendant about sentencing provisions of 
the plea agreement); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585 
(3d Cir. 1974) (petitioner's guilty plea not voluntary where made 
on basis on counsel's statement that two sentences would run 
concurrently and court imposed consecutive sentences). This 
fundamental rule is not altered where, as here, a defendant 
alleges that he was expecting a certain sentence based upon his 
own illegal conduct. Where surrender of a fundamental 
constitutional right is concerned, our inquiry can not be focused 
upon the "clean hands" of the defendant. Instead, we must focus 
upon the "voluntariness" of the surrender. 
 Zilich has offered specific testimony that, if true, would 
negate the voluntariness of his plea and establish that he pled 
guilty only because of a belief he would receive probation in 
  
return for waiving his right to trial. For purposes of ruling 
upon his habeas corpus petition, we must take Zilich's factual 
assertions in the light most favorable to him.  Keller v. 
Petsock, 853 F.2d 1122, 1128 (3d Cir. 1988). If his allegations 
are proven, he will establish at a minimum that there were 
representations made by his counsel that he would receive 
probation in return for his pleading guilty and paying a bribe to 
the judge.  Whatever criminal consequences such a scheme would 
hold for Zilich, the allegations, if true, would entitle him to 
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Thus, we must decide if the 
district court erred in denying Zilich an evidentiary hearing.   
 C. 
 Our inquiry begins with Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-
14, 83 S.Ct. 745, 757, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), in which the Supreme 
Court wrote: "Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court 
in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas 
applicant did not receive a full and fair hearing in a state 
court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral 
proceeding."  Townsend, 372 U.S. at 311. Here, the procedure 
afforded defendant to resolve his allegations falls short of this 
requirement. In United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585 (3d 
Cir. 1974), we held that 
Where the voluntariness of a plea is attacked 
with an assertion that one's counsel or the 
prosecutor, or both, made an out-of-court 
arrangement or 'proposition' as to the 
outcome of a sentence which differs from that 
pronounced by the court, an evidentiary 
hearing will ordinarily be necessary on a 
2255 motion attacking the voluntariness of 
the plea.  
  
 
495 F.2d at 587 (citations omitted). The holding in Valenciano 
has been extended to §2254 petitioners. See Lesko, 925 F.2d at 
1539.  
 We are aware that Zilich was afforded numerous hearings in 
state court, and a federal magistrate judge reviewed the 
transcripts of those hearings before recommending against relief. 
However, Zilich's claims cannot be resolved without a fact finder 
determining credibility. Here the magistrate judge merely 
reviewed transcripts of the various hearings which were held in 
the Court of Common Pleas and made a recommendation to the 
district court based upon that review. The district court then 
adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, and the findings 
implicit within the recommendation, and denied relief based upon 
the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. Under the 
circumstances of this case, such a procedure does not meet the 
standards of affording a "full and fair hearing."  The Supreme 
Court has previously stated, "Where an unresolved factual dispute 
exists, demeanor evidence is a significant factor in adjudging 
credibility. . . . [Q]uestions of credibility, of course, are 
basic to resolution of conflicts in testimony."  Townsend, 372 
U.S. at 322. It is only by observing testimony that the 
factfinder  ". . . can be aware of the variations in demeanor and 
tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's 
understanding of and belief in what is said."  Anderson v. City 
of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 
1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).  This is the very reason 
  
appellate judges defer to the factual conclusions of a hearing 
judge.  
Face to face with living witnesses the 
original trier of the facts holds a position 
of advantage from which appellate judges are 
excluded.  In doubtful cases the exercise of 
his [or her] power of observation often 
proves the most accurate method of 
ascertaining the truth. . . . To the 
sophistication and sagacity of [the trier of 
fact] the law confides the duty of appraisal. 
 
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 
at 851. (citations omitted).  
  
  There cannot even be the semblance of a full 
and fair hearing unless the state court 
actually reached and decided the issues of 
fact tendered by the defendant.                     
Townsend 372 U.S. at 313-314.  
 D. 
 Normally a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief in 
federal court must overcome a presumption that an adverse ruling 
in state court was based upon an adverse credibility 
determination by the state hearing judge. See LaVallee v. Delle 
Rose 410 U.S. 690, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 35 L.Ed.2d. 637 (1973), and 
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 
646 (1983).  This is not such a case. Here, the state trial court 
granted the requested relief based upon the defendant's assertion 
of innocence. Accordingly, the presumption of correctness is 
inapplicable. See Townsend, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 
770 (1963).   
  
 Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), findings of fact of 
state courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness subject 
to specific exceptions.  See Marshall, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 
843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (l983).  One of those exceptions is where the 
merits of the habeas petitioner's claim were not resolved in the 
state court proceeding.  In that instance, the presumption of 
correctness does not apply as there is nothing to which it can 
attach.  28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); Lesko, 925 F.2d at 1540; Sullivan 
v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1084 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 E. 
 The district court, by adopting the magistrate judge's 
Report and Recommendation as its opinion, found that the "record 
here is so complete, that there is no need for an additional 
evidentiary hearing." Magistrate's Report and Recommendation of 
July 21, 1993, at 11.  The magistrate judge also concluded,  
[A]dditionally, because it would appear that 
the record does not substantially support the 
petitioner's allegations that he pled guilty 
because he had been assured of a probationary 
sentence, his allegations here are meritless. 
 
Id.  We disagree.  The district court relied upon the plea 
colloquy in reaching its conclusion that Zilich's plea was 
voluntary.  See Magistrate Judge's Report, at 8, 9, 11.  While 
Zilich's responses to the questions posed by his attorney and the 
district attorney during the colloquy appear to conclusively 
negate Zilich's allegations in his habeas petition, total 
reliance on the colloquy is misplaced under the circumstances 
posed by this case.   
  
The possibility exists that an inherent part 
of the out-of-court understanding was that 
appellant would respond negatively to an open 
court inquiry as to whether promises had been 
made.  
 
Valenciano, 495 F.2d at 587. As noted above, the defendant has 
offered testimony that this was the case.  
 Of course, we take no position as to the truth of the 
defendant's allegations. Nor do we hold that every habeas corpus 
petitioner is entitled to a hearing in federal court merely 
because the petitioner has made certain allegations that, if 
true, would entitle him or her to relief.  As the Supreme Court 
has instructed us 
[T]here are times when allegations of facts 
outside the record can be fully investigated 
without requiring the personal presence of 
the prisoner.  
  . . . But the specific and detailed factual 
assertions of the petitioner, while 
improbable, cannot at this juncture be said 
to be incredible. If the allegations are 
true, the petitioner is clearly entitled to 
relief. 
 
Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. at 495 (1962).   
 Accordingly we hold that, because the merits of Zilich's 
claim were not resolved in the state court, and because they 
require credibility determinations that cannot be resolved by 
review of the cold record, the district court must give him an 
evidentiary hearing. Sullivan, 723 F.2d at 1084.6  
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 Zilich contends that 28 U.S.C. §§2254(d)(1) and (d)(3) 
require that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing when 
the state court did not decide the issues of fact alleged by the 
habeas petitioner.  By finding that the district court erred by 
not granting Zilich an evidentiary hearing, we do not hold that 
those sections require an evidentiary hearing.  We have 
  
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated herein, we will reverse and remand to 
the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Zilich's claim. 
                                                                  
previously indicated that the relationship between Townsend and 
the §2254 exceptions is "still a murky one".  Smith v. Freeman, 
892 F.2d 331, 339 n. 13 (3d Cir. 1989).  We do not now decide 
whether the §2254 exceptions codify the Townsend standards.  




Mansmann, J., concurring. 
 While I concur in the result, I do so with some 
hesitation and concern.  I find it inequitable that a 
petitioner's challenge to the voluntary nature of his guilty plea 
may rest on allegations that the plea was induced by a scheme to 
bribe a judge.  Further, I am troubled by the prejudice to the 
victim and the prosecution that will inevitably result from the 
delayed resolution of this case. 
 However, I am constrained by the language that the 
United States Supreme Court has adopted in setting forth the 
standard against which the consensual character of a plea must be 
measured.  Most recently, in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 
S. Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984), the Court stated: 
 "A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware 
of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him 
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, 
must stand unless induced by threats (or 
promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by 
promises that are by their nature improper as 
having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." 
 
Id. at 509, 104 S. Ct. at 2547, quoting, Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) 
(emphasis added), quoting, Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 
  
101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J., dissenting), reheard en 
banc, 246 F.2d 571, rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S. 
Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958). 
 Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court has decided it 
appropriate to grant broad protection to defendants who enter 
guilty pleas, even those who allege knowing and voluntary 
participation in egregious and illegal conduct.  Since we are not 
writing on a clean slate, I concur with the majority that Zilich 
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to test the voluntariness 
of his plea. 
